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Executive Summary
The Earth Radiation Budget Experiment (ERBE) scanner instrument
aboard the NOAA-10 spacecraft was launched into orbit in
September 1986 and began making routine Earth radiation
measurements in November 1986. On May 22, 1989, the instrument
was operating in the normal Earth scan mode and at the normal
cross-track azimuth position of 0 degrees. At 17:03 UT, in the
middle of a 4-second scan cycle, all values in the instrument
primary data output (DIG A) went to zero. The DIG B data
indicated that the elevation beam motor power had remained on,
and the analog data showed increases in several temperatures at
the time of the malfunction.
Since the malfunction, all of the instrument operational modes
and data storage commands have been exercised, along with some
typical pulse discrete commands to instrument heaters. The tests
were unsuccessful in restoring the instrument to normal
operation, but have provided the data needed to analyze the
malfunction. In the final test performed, the instrument was
powered off and powered back on about 3 hours later. The
instrument was powered off in an attempt to bleed off excess
charge which might have been deposited in a gate by a radiation
event. This report discusses command testing, the instrument
responses during the tests, and describes the analysis, together
with results and conclusions, which was performed to determine
the cause of the malfunction.
The data output from the instrument, both housekeeping and
radiometric, appear to be valid, and the instrument responses to
several of the operational mode commands are completely normal.
However, the instrument fails to correctly execute either the
automated (preprogrammed) internal or solar calibration
sequences. And, unfortunately, the instrument will not perform
correctly in any operational scan mode. When the instrument is
commanded to operate in any of the operational scan modes, it
stops scanning after scan beam initialization, and all values in
the DIG A data revert to zero. Sending a CPU Reset command at
any time restores the DIG A data to normal values.
The increase in housekeeping temperatures at the time of the
malfunction and the subsequent decreases following first CPU
Reset command were nearly identical to those seen after the
failure of the NOAA-9 scanner instrument. This appears to be the
extent of the similarity between the two failures. The NOAA-9
scanner instrument DIG A data were not restored to valid values
by the CPU Reset command and the instrument never responded to
any mode commands.
The problem with the NOAA-10 scanner instrument was traced to a
failure in the internal address decoding circuitry in one of the
ROM (Read Only Memory) chips in the instrument. Unfortunately,
there is no method of reprogramming the processor. It is
recommended that the CERES instruments and other instruments with
extended mission requirements, which rely on computers for their
operation, be designed with the capability to be reprogrammed by
ground commands.
Backqround
Overview of Instrument Operational Design Features
The scanner instrument was designed to perform a wide range of
operations. An overview of the instrument operational design
features is given here, and further details can be found in
reference I. The azimuth beam can rotate between 0 and 180
degrees in the local horizon plane, and the rotation plane of the
elevation (scan) beam is normal to the azimuth plane. Each
instrument has its own computer which is used to direct and
control instrument operations. Commands can be issued directly
from the ground or from command tables uplinked and stored in the
spacecraft computer memory. Table I is a list of the instrument
operational commands. A mode command directs the instrument to
perform a specific function or to change its operational mode.
Data storage commands store azimuth angle data required in some
of the azimuth-rotation commands. The automated calibration
sequence commands (8AI and 8A2 in table I) direct the instrument
to perform the sequence of mode commands listed in table 2 in the
order and at the relative times shown. No other mode commands
can be executed while an automated calibration sequence is in
progress. The solar calibration sequences are slightly different
for the instruments on the ERBS and NOAA spacecraft and the
sequence for the instruments on the NOAA spacecraft, only, is
shown in table 2b.
In-Flight Operations
The scanner instrument on NOAA-10 is one of three which have been
launched into Earth orbit as part of the Earth Radiation Budget
Experiment. Each ERBE scanner instrument is paired on a
different spacecraft with a nonscanner (fixed field of view)
instrument. The first instruments were launched into orbit on
the ERBS spacecraft by the Space Shuttle Challenger on October 5,
1984. ERBS is operated by NASA from the Goddard Spaceflight
Center in Greenbelt, Maryland. The spacecraft is in a 600-km
altitude orbit with right ascension of the ascending node
precessing westward at about 4 degrees per day. The other
instruments were launched into orbit aboard the NOAA-9 and
NOAA-10 TIROS-N weather satellites in December 1984 and September
1986, respectively. The NOAA spacecraft are operated by NOAA
from Suitland, Maryland. Both spacecraft are in nearly
Table 1
Scanner Instrument Operations Commands
[
Operational Mode Commands
Command Description
Azimuth to 0 deg position
Azimuth to 90 deg position
Azimuth to 180 deg position
Azimuth to position A
Azimuth to position B
Azimuth scan between 0 and A
Scan to stow position
Normal Earth Scan
Nadir Earth Scan
Short Earth Scan
Mam Scan
SWICS off
SWICS at level 3
SWICS at level 3 - modulated
SWICS at level 2
SWICS at level 2 - modulated
SWICS at level 1
SWICS at level 1 - modulated
Hexadecimal
Cmd Code
811
812
813
814
815
816
821
822
823
824
825
891
892
893
894
895
896
897
Internal calibration sequence
Solar calibration sequence
8AI
8A2
Azimuth Angle Data Storage Commands
Command Description
Address for azimuth position A
Address for azimuth position B
Data, Most significant byte
Data, Least significant byte
Hexadecimal
Cmd Code
419
41B
2xx
I xx
Note: xx indicates actual azimuth position data.
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Table 2
Scanner Instrument Automated Calibration Sequences
I I I
(a) - Internal Calibration Sequence
Step Elapsed Time Hex
No. Hr:Min:Sec Command
Event Description
1 00:00:00 8A1
2 00:00:32 897
3 00:02:08 895
4 00:03:44 893
5 00:05:20 891
00:08:00
6 00:08:32 897
7 00:10:08 895
8 00:11:44 893
9 00:13:20 891
00:32:00
10 00:32:32 897
11 00:34:08 895
12 00:35:44 893
13 00:37:20 891
Begin Internal Cal
Sequence
SWICS Level #I Modulated
SWICS Level #2 Modulated
SWICS Level #3 Modulated
SWICS Off
*See note 1
SWICS Level #I Modulated
SWICS Level #2 Modulated
SWICS Level #3 Modulated
SWICS Off
*See note 2
SWICS Level #1 Modulated
SWICS Level #2 Modulated
SWICS Level #3 Modulated
SWICS Off
Note 1 -
Note 2 -
Black Body Heaters Turned On By Pulse Discrete
Command
Black Body Heaters Turned Off By Pulse
Discrete Command
(b) - Solar Calibration Sequence For NOAA Spacecraft
Step Elapsed Time Hex
No. Hr:Min:Sec Command
Event Description
1 00:00:00 8A2
2 00:00:32 824
3 00:01:04 811
4 00:01:36 814
5 00:06:24 825
6 00:11:44 815
7 00:18:08 814
8 00:23:28 824
9 00:24:00 811
10 00:28:48 822
Begin Solar Cal Sequence
Short Earth Scan
Azimuth to 0 degrees
Azimuth to Position A
MAM scan
Azimuth to Position B
Azimuth to Position A
Short Earth Scan
Azimuth to 0 degrees
Normal Earth Scan
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Sun-synchronous orbits (825 to 875 km altitude), each with a
different mean local time for its orbit node crossing. The ERBS
orbit produces a more severe and more variable thermal
environment at the spacecraft than the orbits of NOAA-9 and
NOAA-10, but the higher altitude orbits of the NOAA spacecraft
produce more severe space radiation environments.
All the scanner instruments have been operated primarily in the
normal Earth scan mode and at an azimuth position of either 0 or
180 degrees to provide continuous measurements in a cross-track
scan plane. The instruments on ERBS and NOAA-10 have been
operated at other azimuth angles during periods of low Sun beta
angle (angle between Sun and orbit momentum vectors) to prevent
the detectors from scanning the Sun. For brief periods of time,
the instruments on ERBS and NOAA-9 have been operated at an
azimuth position of 90 degrees to obtain measurements in the
along-track scan plane. Internal calibrations of all the scanner
instruments have been performed about every two weeks. Solar
calibrations have been less regular because of instrument azimuth
beam rotation and scanner elevation beam anomalies, problems
which are discussed in the next section. Only one solar
calibration was ever performed with the scanner instrument on
NOAA-10.
Previous Instrument Anomalies
All three scanner instruments have experienced the scan beam
anomaly problem. The problem is usually characterized by
sluggishness when the scan beam is in one of the boost
(high-acceleration) portions of a 4-second scan cycle, and the
sluggishness is sometimes accompanied by a rise in some of the
scan drive electronics temperatures. The problem was observed
with each of the instruments about 3 months after launch into
orbit. The problem has been severe at times, causing the scan
beam to hang up or stop during a scan. The investigation
reported in reference 2, which covered the scan beam anomaly on
ERBS and NOAA-9, concluded that the most probable cause of the
scan beam anomaly was a problem in the scanner beam bearing
lubrication system. The investigators found a high probability
that the rise in temperature, which accompanies the anomaly, is
due to the instrument operating continuously in the high power
mode which is normally only associated with the boost mode
(high-acceleration) portion of the scan cycle. The investigators
correctly predicted that the problem would also occur with the
scanner instrument on the NOAA-10 spacecraft. No evidence was
found that the scan beam anomaly was related to the instrument
computer.
An azimuth beam rotation anomaly has occurred from time to time
on all three scanner and nonscanner instruments. In the azimuth
beam rotation anomaly, the azimuth position sensor apparently
reads erroneous position data when commanded to change azimuth
modes, causing the azimuth beam to rotate incorrectly and usually
to end up at the wrong azimuth position. The problem was first
observed with the instrument on the ERBS spacecraft on February
20, 1985 when the azimuth beam did not return to its normal
position of 180 degrees after a routine solar calibration. The
problem resulted in the detectors directly scanning the Sun,
causing a change in the spectral response of one of the
detectors. On the NOAA-10 spacecraft in November 1986, the
anomaly was observed during the first attempt to perform a solar
calibration of the scanner instrument. The anomaly resulted in
the decision to discontinue solar calibrations of the instrument.
The anomaly was studied in 1985 and 1986, and it was concluded
that the anomaly was caused by the Sun interfering with the
azimuth position sensor during beam rotation. Stray Sun light
probably illuminates the azimuth position sensor photo detector
causing erroneous position data. The instrument computer does
not appear to be responsible for the azimuth rotation anomaly.
The scanner instrument on the NOAA-9 spacecraft failed on January
20, 1987, and all attempts to restore the primary (DIG A) data
output have been unsuccessful. Similarities between the scanner
failure on NOAA-9 and the scanner malfunction on NOAA-10 are
discussed in the next section.
Description of Malfunction and Troubleshootinq Approach
Malfunction, Preliminary Testing and Analysis
At 17:03 Universal Time on May 22, all values in the primary
output data (DIG A) of the scanner instrument on NOAA-10 went to
zero. The bilevel data (DIG B) and several instrument
temperatures and voltages (analog), which are output on a
different data buses than that of the DIG A data, remained valid.
The DIG B data indicated that the scanner elevation motor power
remained on after the malfunction, and figure l(a) shows how two
of the instrument analog temperatures began to increase at the
time of the malfunction.
The first CPU Reset command was executed on May 23. The CPU
Reset causes a hardware reset of the instrument computer. This
clears the computer registers, restarts the stored program, and
resets some scanner hardware. The scanner elevation motor power
was turned off by the CPU Reset, and figure l(b) shows that the
analog temperatures began to decrease at that time. The CPU
Reset command also restored the primary (DIG A) data to valid
values. After the instrument was sent a normal Earth scan
command (see table I), the scan beam apparently executed a normal
16-second initialization sequence. This conclusion is based on
the output of the elevation beam position sensor and the
radiometric detectors. At the end of the initialization
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sequence, the elevation motor power was apparently turned off
automatically, and the DIG A data again reverted to zero values.
Elevation position data, transmitted following a subsequent CPU
Reset, indicates that the scanner elevation beam appeared to have
achieved position lock at the normal Earth scan space-look
position. Several times on May 23 and 24, the instrument was
sent CPU Reset commands, followed by normal Earth scan mode
commands. In every case, the instrument response was identical
to the response received the first time these commands were sent
on May 23. On May 26, a CPU Reset command, only, was sent to the
instrument, and no other commands were sent until May 31. The
DIG A data remained valid, and instrument housekeeping and
radiometric data showed typical responses to the in-orbit heating
environment during this five-day period.
Before the malfunction on May 22, the instrument was operating in
the normal Earth scan mode and at the cross-track azimuth
position of 0 degrees. The instrument had been operating
continuously in the normal Earth scan mode since December 5,
1986. The azimuth beam had been rotated to the cross-track
position of 0 degrees on April 16, 1989, a few days after the
spacecraft had exited a full-Sun orbit condition. An automated
internal calibration had been performed on May 10, 1989. Thus,
the last command which had been executed by the instrument was a
SWICS off command (see table 2a). Instrument data for May 21 and
for the period before the malfunction on May 22 indicate no
unusual behavior of the instrument. The scan beam was a little
sluggish, but the sluggishness was much less severe than that
observed during some earlier periods, particularly from January
to March 1987.
The DIG B data and analog temperatures of the scanner instrument
on the NOAA-9 spacecraft showed nearly identical responses at the
time of the failure on January 20, 1987, and at the time of the
first CPU Reset command. However, there were no other
similarities observed between the malfunction of the scanner
instrument on the NOAA-10 spacecraft and the failure of the
scanner instrument on the NOAA-9 spacecraft. The DIG A data of
the instrument on NOAA-9 was never restored to valid values, and
the instrument has never responded to any commands after the
initial CPU Reset command.
Command Tests and Instrument Responses
All the instrument operational mode and data storage commands
were tested during the period from June 5 to September 15, 1989,
and two heaters were turned off and on via pulse discrete
commands (see table 3). Most of the commands were sent during
communication linkups between the spacecraft and the operations
control center at NOAA/NESDIS in Suitland, Maryland, and Langley
personnel were at NOAA during some of the command testing. This
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Table 3
Instrument Command Tests and Responses
Command
PEDESTAL HEATER ON
PEDESTAL HEATER OFF
BLACK BODY HEATERS ON
BLACK BODY HEATERS OFF
On/Off Commands To Heaters
Date Instrument Response
Jun 1 Bi-level data showed heater ON
Jun I Bi-level data showed heater OFF
Jun I Bi-level data showed heaters ON
Jun 1 Bi-level data showed heaters OFF
Black body temperatures responded
normally.
AZIMUTH ANGLE A
Data Storage Commands
Jun 5 Instrument processed address and
data commands normally for
20-degree azimuth value.
SWICS MODULATED -
LEVEL #I
LEVEL #2
LEVEL #3
SWICS UNMODULATED -
LEVEL #1
LEVEL #2
LEVEL #3
ROTATE AZ TO 0 DEG
ROTATE AZ TO 90 DEG
ROTATE AZ TO 180 DEG
ROTATE AZ TO ANGLE A
(20 DEGREES)
ROTATE AZ TO ANGLE B
(45 DEGREES)
ROTATE CONTINUOUSLY
BETWEEN 0 AND 35 DEG
Operational Mode Commands
Jun 19
Jun 2
Jun 19
Sep 5
Sep 5
Sep 5
SWICS amplifier output normal
SWICS amplifier output normal
SWICS amplifier output normal
SWICS amplifier output normal
SWICS amplifier output normal
SWICS amplifier output normal
Jun 6
Sep 6
Sep 6
Jun 6
Azimuth beam rotation normal
Azimuth beam rotation normal
Azimuth beam rotation normal
Azimuth beam rotation normal
Sep 6 Azimuth beam rotation normal
Sep 6
Sep 6
Azimuth beam rotation normal
Azimuth beam rotation appeared to
be normal.
NORMAL EARTH SCAN
SHORT EARTH SCAN
NADIR EARTH SCAN
SOLAR MAM SCAN
SCAN TO STOW
AUTOMATED INT CAL SEQ
May 23
Jun 6
Jun 7
Jun 7
Jun 7
Jul 5
Scan beam initialize, scanner
motor power turned off, DIG A
data reverted to zeros (all
scan mode commands).
Incorrect Sequence. Mod SWICS
level #3 command turned on and off
several times. (Table 4a)
AUTOMATED SOL CAL SEQ Sep 15 Incorrect Sequence (Table 4b).
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arrangement permitted the instrument behavior and responses to
the commands to be monitored directly, and for go/no-go decisions
on testing to be made in real time. Table 3 lists each of the
commands sent, by category, the date on which the command was
exercised, and comments on the instrument response to the
command. Some of the commands were exercised more than one time,
and the execution date listed for a command is the first date of
execution for which all the DIG A data were available in the data
stream. The two-month lapse between the internal calibration
sequence test on July 5 and the next commands issued on September
6, was used to analyze the data output from the execution of the
internal calibration sequence. The responses to the commands are
discussed in this section, and a detailed analysis of the output
data is presented in the next section.
The responses of the two heaters which were tested on June I were
completely normal and are believed to be representative of
responses for all heaters. Therefore, no further heater testing
was performed.
The instrument responded normally to all azimuth mode commands.
The command to rotate continuously between angle 0 degrees and
angle A (35 degrees in this case) had not been previously tested
in flight. The azimuth angle data for 20 degrees which was
processed by the data storage commands on June 5 were used in the
successful azimuth beam rotation to 20 degrees on June 6.
Only the modulated SWICS commands, which are executed during the
internal calibration sequences, had been previously executed in
orbit, and none of the 6 SWICS commands had been tested
individually in orbit. The responses to all the SWICS commands,
however, are believed to be completely normal. The magnitudes of
the SWICS amplifier outputs at all levels were identical to the
levels typically observed during internal calibrations.
The responses to all the scan mode commands were identical to the
responses to the normal Earth scan commands executed on May 23
and 24. In each case, the scanner elevation beam appeared to go
through a 16-second initialization sequence and to be positioned
at the space look angle of 14 degrees at the end of the sequence.
The elevation motor power was then turned off automatically, and
the values of the DIG A data reverted to zeros.
The automated internal calibration sequence command (Hex command
code 8AI) stored in the NOAA-10 spacecraft computer command table
is issued routinely every two weeks. However, July 5 was the
first calibration date after the malfunction for which the output
of the complete calibration sequence was available in the DIG A
data stream. The DIG A data were invalid when the first sequence
was issued on May 24 (no CPU Reset command was in effect), and
the command sequences on June 10 and June 26 were interrupted by
CPU Reset commands which were issued prior to completion of the
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sequences. The CPU Reset commands were issued from the ground
when it appeared that the internal calibration sequence had
terminated abnormally. The instrument responses have been
identical for all internal calibration sequence commands issued
since July 5. Table 4a compares the instrument responses during
a typical calibration before and after the malfunction. Figure 2
shows typical SWICS amplifier output for normal and abnormal
sequences. A total of 13 mode commands (including the internal
calibration sequence command) are issued during both normal and
abnormal command sequences, but the commands and the relative
times at which they are executed are incorrect for the abnormal
sequence. The level #3 modulated SWICS command is seen to be
turned on and off 6 different times during the nearly 10-hour
execution period of the abnormal command sequence.
Table 4b compares the execution of the first five commands in the
automated solar calibration sequence for a normal execution and
the abnormal execution on September 15. The command echo word
showed an invalid command code (804) at the time when a short
Earth scan mode command (824) should have been executed. The
third command (rotate in azimuth to angle A) was correct in the
abnormal sequence, but it was executed more than 2 hours late,
and the invalid command code, 804, appeared again in the command
echo a little over 2 hours after the valid command. A MAM scan
command was executed about three and one half hours after the
beginning of the sequence. The instrument response was identical
to that during the execution of all scan mode commands since the
malfunction. After the DIG A values went to zero, a CPU Reset
command was sent, restoring the DIG A data.
The final test of the instrument was performed on October 17 when
the instrument was powered down, and after about 3 hours, powered
back up. During the three hour period when instrument power was
off, several housekeeping temperatures dropped below their normal
operating values. After power-up, a normal Earth scan command
was executed, and the instrument response was again the same as
for all previous scan mode commands. A CPU Reset command was
then executed, which restored the DIG A data to valid values.
Housekeeping temperatures returned to their normal operational
range within a few hours. The instrument will be left in the
power-on state, and the instrument output will be monitored.
There are no plans to perform further testing of the instrument.
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Table 4
Comparison of Calibration Sequences Execution
Before and After the Malfunction
i
(a} - Internal Calibration Sequence
Before Malfunction (Normal} After Malfunction
Step Elapsed
No. Time
(H:M:S}
Event Description Elapsed
Time
(H:M:S}
Event Description
I 00:00:00
2 00:00:32
3 00:02:08
4 00:03:44
5 00:05:20
00:08:00
6 00:08:32
7 00:I0:08
8 00:11:44
9 00:13:20
00:32:00
10 00:32:32
11 00:34:08
12 00:35:44
13 00:37:20
Int Cal Seq Cmd (8AI)
SWICS Lev #I Mod (897)
SWICS Lev #2 Mod (895)
SWICS Lev #3 Mod (893)
SWICS Off (891)
*See note I
SWICS Lev #I Mod (897)
SWICS Lev #2 Mod (895)
SWICS Lev #3 Mod (893)
SWICS Off (891)
*See note 2
SWICS Lev #1Mod (897)
SWICS Lev #2 Mod (895)
SWICS Lev #3 Mod (893)
SWICS Off (891)
00:00:00
00:00:32
00:08:00
00:32:00
02:16:32
04:33:04
04:38:24
04:41:36
06:50:40
06:58:08
09:10:24
09:14:40
09:40:16
09:41:52
09:43:28
Int Cal Seq Cmd
SWICS Lev #3 Mod
*See note I
*See note 2
SWICS Off
SWICS lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
SWICS lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
SWICS lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
SWICS lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
SWICS lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
Note 1 - Black Body Heaters Turned On By Pulse Discrete Command
Note 2 - Black Body Heaters Turned Off By Pulse Discrete Command
(b) - Solar Calibration Sequence
Before Malfunction (Normal)
Step Elapsed
No. Time
(H:M:S)
I 00:00:00
2 00:00:32
3 00:01:04
4 00:01:36
5 00:06:24
After Malfunction
Event Description Elapsed
Time
(H:M:S)
Event Description
Solar Cal Seq Cmd (8A2)
Short Earth Scan (824)
Azimuth to 0 deg (811)
Azimuth to Pos A (814)
MAM scan (825)
00:00:00
00:00:32
02:16:32
02:18:08
04:33:04
Sol Cal Seq Cmd
Invalid Cmd - Hex
cmd code 804
Azimuth to 0 deg
Invalid Cmd - Hex
cmd code 804
MAM scan
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Failure Analysis
The flight data gathered over the period from May 22 to July 5
was reviewed and analyzed in a attempt to identify the failure
mode, probable cause of the failure, and guidelines for
restoration of instrument operation. Initial review of the data
indicated that many instrument functions were still operating
normally. Thus to simplify the analysis process, the assumption
was made that the malfunction was the result of a single point
failure. The instrument data for each response was analyzed to
eliminate subsystems and components as potential causes of the
malfunction.
Observations and Analysis
Reset Command
The CPU Reset command causes a hardware reset of the
microprocessor; which in turn causes all internal registers to be
cleared and a restart of the firmware code. The ROM code
initialization causes the RAM memory to be cleared and
initialization of selected scanner hardware including removal of
power from the elevation motor drive circuit. The fact that the
processor responded to a reset instruction and normal data
transfers were restored, indicated that the spacecraft command
and data transfer circuitry, spacecraft 1.2M Hz clock, counter
and interrupt circuits are functioning normally, and that the
microprocessor, ROM, and RAM memories are functioning normally
for at least a substantial portion of the instruction set and
memory area. Initialization, data acquisition, and telemetry
transfers require proper operation of substantial portions of the
background program as well as interrupts 3 and 4, and use large
variable blocks in the RAM memory. See memory map figure 3.
Spacecraft DIG A Data Transfer
Analysis of the hardware and software responsible for the
transfer of DIG A data from the instrument microprocessor to the
spacecraft interface indicates that the transfer of meaningful
data from the microprocessor memory to the spacecraft interface
is totally dependent on correct and timely execution of software
routines by the microprocessor. In the event that the
microprocessor fails to transmit data to the spacecraft
instrument the interface hardware will transmit a continuous
stream of zeros when prompted.
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Since the DIG A data stream is restored following a reset, it is
unlikely that there is a failure in the instrument serial data
interface hardware or the spacecraft interface. It is far more
likely that the microprocessor is not sending the data because of
a failure of the microprocessor or related circuits.
Azimuth Commands
The normal response of the scanner instrument to all azimuth
commands indicated that the azimuth mechanism and drive are
functioning normally, and supports the argument for proper
computer operation. Execution of azimuth commands require the
proper function of the interrupt service routine for interrupt 2
and a portion of the background program not required for
initialization, data acquisition, or telemetry transfer. See
memory map figure 3.
Scan Commands
There are 5 different scan mode commands (Normal, Nadir, Stow,
Short, MAM), but each scan command begins with the same
initialization sequence.
Scanner elevation position data is derived by counting pulses
from an incremental encoder. Following an instrument power-up,
the elevation position counter requires the initialization
sequence to preset the counter as the scan head passes through
the nadir (encoder index) position. However, as long as
instrument power is not removed the counter should maintain the
correct position value. The initialization sequence includes
movement of the elevation scan head at a controlled speed in
clockwise (CW) and counter clockwise (CCW) directions, and the
acquisition of position lock at the space-look position (1000
encoder count).
The observed response to each of the scan mode commands was
identical. For each scan mode command the scanner elevation beam
was observed to drive nominally in both CW and CCW directions for
the prescribed time periods. The DIG A data reverted to zeros
before the elevation beam data indicated a position lock at space
or the start of the requested scan sequence. The failure
indications were similar to the initial malfunction. The DIG A
data stream went to all zeros, but the increase in temperature
was not observed and the DIG B data indicated that power had been
removed from the scan motor drive. Elevation position data
following a reset indicated that the scanner head was sitting at
the nominal space look position (1000 counts). Analysis of
position displacement data from subsequent initialization
sequences also indicated that the head was actually resting at
the nominal space-look position. This indicates that position
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lock at space was achieved at the end of initialization, and that
the motor power was removed prior to the scanner drive receiving
the first velocity command in the scan command sequence, the
velocity command was not issued, or both of these events
occurred.
This data is significant as the command path and the actual
hardware commands issued to the scanner drive during
initialization are identical to those issued at the beginning of
each scan sequence. This rules out problems with the mechanical
or electrical scanner drive components, command path, loading of
the power bus, or loss of the spacecraft clock.
In addition it permits a possible explanation for the temperature
rise noted following the initial malfunction and the absence of
this temperature rise in subsequent tests. This temperature rise
phenomena has been observed and documented as part of the ERBE
Scanner Instrument Anomaly Investigation (Reference 2). The
scanner drive has two power modes, high and low, which are
autonomously selected on the basis of the error signal presented
to the driver. Power dissipation in high power mode is 4 times
higher than for low power mode. During nominal operation, high
power mode is activated for only a small fraction of total scan
time. Since the initial failure occurred with the scan head in
mid-scan and all indications are that the scanner drive was
faithfully executing the last received velocity command, the
scanner drive would have continued to drive the scan head at
continuous velocity until the head impacted the mechanical stops.
With the scanner drive executing a velocity drive command, and
the head mechanically restrained the error signal to the motor
drive would have saturated and forced the driver into continuous
high power mode. This has been shown to result in temperature
rises similar to those observed following the malfunction. In
the subsequent tests, following CPU-Reset commands, no heating
would be expected as the head was locked at the space-look
position, and motor power was removed.
SWICS Commands and Internal Calibration Sequence Command
Individual Short Wave Internal Calibration Source (SWICS)
commands were issued for modulated levels I, 2 and 3, and the
instrument performed nominally. This verified that the
instrument was capable of executing SWICS commands for each of
the 3 levels.
The internal calibration sequence command normally executes a
series of SWICS modulated level commands from level I to level 3
at preset time intervals to create a profile as shown in figure
2a. However, when the internal calibration sequence was issued
to the NOAA-10 scanner following the malfunction, a sequence of
SWICS level 3 and SWICS off commands were executed with a
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radically different time sequence as shown in figure 2b. The
total number of SWICS commands was the same as for a normal
sequence, and following the completion of the sequence the
scanner returned to its "standby" mode. Primary instrument data
(DIG A) remained valid throughout and following the internal
calibration sequence.
Program Memory Considerations
The fact that the only commands which produced anomalous or
failure condition were internal sequence commands, prompted a
review of the manner in which these commands were executed and
their relative location in memory. The routines responsible for
execution of these commands showed no apparent unique common code
or instructions, but the tabular information used by both of
these routines was determined to be the sole contents of the high
R0M chip (A2AI-U50).
A comparison of the internal calibration SWICS commands, and the
erroneously executed SWICS commands, shown in table 4, suggested
some interesting failure mechanisms. The internal calibration
table consists of twenty-five bytes of information which define
twelve internal instrument command events, and a sequence stop
byte, shown in table 5. Each event is defined by an event time
relative to the major frame counter, which is reset when the
internal calibration command is received, and an internal SWICS
command to be executed at the prescribed time. The stored
commands are same as the lower byte of the instrument level
commands. As an example, execution of the internal table hex
value 97H causes the same SWICS function as the instrument level
hex command 897H. Note that the command sequence Level 1 (97H),
Level 2 (95H), Level 3 (93H), and SWICS Off (91H) are repeated
three times; that the Level 3 and SWICS Off commands can be
derived from the Level 1 and Level 2 commands respectively by
clearing a single bit (b2); and that the Level I and Level 2
commands are offset from the Level 3 and SWICS Off commands
respectively by 4 counts which can-be achieved by setting a
single address bit (b2).
The SWICS internal calibration sequence became the Rosetta Stone
for the remaining trouble shooting and analysis which was
performed almost .exclusively by analysis and simulation of the
microprocessor and high ROM program code interaction.
To execute the internal calibration sequence the processor loads
the first event time and first command from the table, then on
each subsequent major frame interrupt (32 sec) it compares the
major frame counter to the first event time, and if the event
time matches the major frame counter it issues the first internal
SWICS command. Once the sequence commands are issued the
software and hardware mechanism for their execution is identical
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Step
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Table 5
Comparison of Calibration Command Tables
Before and After Malfunction
(a) - Internal Calibration Sequence
Before Malfunction (Normal) After Malfunction
Command Time Code Description
Code Hex (Dec)
Command Time Code
Code Hex (Dec)
Int Cal Seq
97 01 (1) Lev #1Mod 93 01 (I)
95 04 (4) Lev #2 Mod 91 00 (0)
93 07 (7) Lev #3 Mod 93 00 (0)
91 0A (10) SWICS Off 91 0A (10)
97 10 (16) Lev #1 Mod 93 10 (16)
95 13 (19) Lev #2 Mod 91 02 (2)
93 16 (22) Lev #3 Mod 93 10 (16)
91 19 (25) SWICS Off 91 08 (8)
97 3D (61) Lev #1Mod 93 10 (16)
95 40 (64) Lev #2 Mod 91 40 (64)
93 43 (67) Lev #3 Mod 93 43 (67)
91 46 (70) SWICS Off 91 46 (70)
Description
Int Cal Seq
Lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
Lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
Lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
Lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
Lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
Lev #3 Mod
SWICS Off
Step
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Notes:
(b) - Solar Calibration Sequence
Before Malfunction (Normal) After Malfunction
Command Time Code Description
Code Hex (Dec)
Command Time Code Description
Code Hex (Dec)
Solar Cal Seq
24 01 (I) Short Scan 04
11 02 (2) Azimuth to 0 11
14 03 (3) Azimuth to A 04
25 12 (18) MAM Scan 25
15 22 (34) Azimuth to B
14 34 (52) Azimuth to A
24 44 (68) Short Scan
11 45 (69) Azimuth to 0
22 54 (22) Normal Scan
01 (1)
O0 (0)
03 (3)
00 (0)
Sol Cal Seq
Invalid Cmd -
Hex 804
Azimuth to 0
Invalid Cmd -
Hex 804
MAM scan -
Fail after
init.
(1) Stored commands do not contain the high byte "8".
(2) Bold type indicates correct command or event time.
I li
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to that for SWICS commands issued by the spacecraft. The
internal calibration sequence continues issuing SWICS commands at
the prescribed intervals until it encounters the stop byte, an
interval time of 255 (FF Hexadecimal).
An understanding of the major frame counter is essential to
understanding the extremely long internal calibration sequence
intervals observed for the malfunctioning scanner instrument.
The major frame counter is a byte wide and thus acts as a modulus
256 counter. Thus, if the succeeding event time which the
processor receives from the ROM data table is the same or less
than the present major frame value the major frame counter will
have to cycle through zero to match the counter with the event
time.
SWICS Internal Calibration Implementation
Analysis of flight data from the malfunctioning scanner
instrument indicated the number of major frame intervals which
occurred between SWICS commands. From these intervals and the
fact that the first command was issued on the first major frame
the assumed event time codes shown in table 5 were derived.
First Failure Hypothesis
A failure in the microprocessor, address bank decoding circuits,
address buffers, or high ROM is causing one or more address
and/or data bits to be cleared or set when reading data and code
from the high ROM memory. This erroneous data and code is in
turn producing the observed system malfunction.
First Hypothesis Testing
The cross mapping of high memory addresses into low memory was
rejected as a probable cause of the failure when the low memory
data in either of the 2 low ROMs could not support the SWICS
Level 3 and SWICS Off sequence. This eliminates the bank
decoding circuitry as a likely cause of the malfunction.
A computer program generated and tested thousands of combinations
of address and/or data bits set or cleared in an attempt to match
both the SWICS and event time sequences observed in the flight
data. Hundreds of combinations were generated which produced the
proper command sequence, but none of the event time sequences
were even close to the sequence derived from the flight data.
For this reason it is considered unlikely that a combination of
address and data bits set or cleared is a likely cause of the
problem. This eliminates the microprocessor and bus drives as a
likely cause of the malfunction.
2O
Further comparison of internal calibration data table commands
and event times with the commands and event times derived from
the flight data, indicated that there were 2 blocks of table data
which could have been read normally. These blocks (addresses
10D4H-10D7H & 10E4H-10E7H) are each 4 bytes long and separated
by a span of 12 bytes. This address pattern suggested a revised
failure hypothesis.
Revised Failure Hypothesis
A failure in the address decoding logic of the high R0M (A2 A1-
U50), causing a logical ANDing of multiple memory locations,
would result in erroneous data and code being executed by the
microprocessor. Specifically, data output from the ROM is the
logical ANDing of the data at the specified address with the data
at the location with the specified address modified by setting
bit 2 and clearing bit 3 as shown in table 6. This erroneous
data and code processed by the microprocessor in turn produces
the observed system malfunction.
Revised Hypothesis Testing
An Internal Calibration Sequence data table corresponding to this
failure hypothesis was generated. The commands and event times
from this table were compared with commands and event times
apparently being executed by the flight instrument. The
agreement was perfect.
Demonstrating the connection between the proposed ROM failure and
scan mode command related failure required greater effort. The
high R0M contains 2 type of "tables" which are used to produce
the 5 scan profiles. There is a data table for each of the 5
scan modes, which contains a sequence of event times and code
entry pointers, which in turn define the piecewise continuous
scan profiles. The first byte contains the event time which is
similar to the internal calibration event times except that they
are referenced to the 33.3 ms (120 count} interrupt driven clock.
The next two bytes contain the address of a block of code, also
in the high ROM, which executes a scanner drive level command
(e.g. slew clockwise in velocity mode at 66 degrees per second).
A complete high ROM data/code set corresponding to this failure
hypothesis was generated, and used in a computer simulation of
the microprocessor and associated circuits. A simulation of the
normal scan command was performed, and the results account for
the observed flight instrument behavior. The simulation
indicated nominal performance through the initialization
sequence. When the processor attempted to use data from the
table, erroneous commands were issued including a command to
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Table 6
Internal Calibration Sequence Table
Normal and Erroneous Data
Memory Address Memory Data
Hex Binary Hex Binary
Mask Data Erroneous Data
Hex Binary Hex Binary
10CF 0001 0000 1100 1111 01 0000 0001 67 0110 0111 01 0000 0001
10D0 0001 0000 1101 0000 97 1001 0111 93 1001 0011 93 1001 0011
10D1 0001 0000 1101 0001 04 0000 0100 0A 0000 1010 00 0000 0000
10D2 0001 0000 1101 0010 95 1001 0101 91 1001 0001 91 1001 0001
10D3 0001 0000 1101 0011 07 0000 0111 10 0001 0000 00 0000 0000
10D4 0001 0000 1101 0100 93 1001 0011 93 1001 0011 93 1001 0011
10D5 0001 0000 1101 0101 0A 0000 1010 0A 0000 1010 0A 0000 1010
10D6 0001 0000 1101 0110 91 1001 0001 91 1001 0001 91 1001 0001
10D7 0001 0000 1101 0111 10 0001 0000 10 0001 0000 10 0001 0000
10D8 0001 0000 1101 1000 97 1001 0111 93 1001 0011 93 1001 0011
10D9 0001 0000 1101 1001 13 0001 0011 0A 0000 1010 02 0000 0010
10DA 0001 0000 1101 1010 95 1001 01 01 91 1001 0001 91 1001 0001
10DB 0001 0000 1101 1011 16 0001 0110 I0 0001 0000 10 0001 0000
10DC 0001 0000 1101 1100 93 1001 0011 93 1001 0011 93 1001 0011
10DD 0001 0000 1101 1101 19 0001 1001 0A 0000 1010 08 0000 1000
10DE 0001 0000 1101 1110 91 1001 0001 91 1001 0001 91 1001 0001
10DF 0001 0000 1101 1111 3D 0011 1101 10 0001 0000 10 0001 0000
10E0 0001 0000 1110 0000 97 1001 0111 93 1001 0011 93 1001 0011
10E1 0001 0000 1110 0001 40 0100 0000 46 0100 0110 40 0100 0000
IOE2 0001 0000 1110 0010 95 1001 01 01 91 1001 0001 91 1001 0001
10E3 0001 0000 1110 0011 43 0100 0011 FF 1111 1111 43 0100 0011
IOE4 0001 0000 1110 0100 93 1001 0011 93 1001 0011 93 1001 0011
10E5 0001 0000 1110 01 01 46 0100 0110 46 0100 0110 46 0100 0110
IOE6 0001 0000 1110 0110 91 1001 0001 91 1001 0001 91 1001 0001
IOE7 0001 0000 1110 0111 FF 1111 1111 FF 1111 1111 FF 1111 1111
Note: Bold print indicates commands or event times which are not
modified by the fault.
remove power from the elevation drive motor. The processor then
executed a command at location 1000 hex for which the erroneous
value read from ROM was zero.
The CDP-1802 machine instruction corresponding to the value zero
is the IDLE instruction which is somewhat unique to the 1802
processor family. The function of the instruction is to place
the processor in a kind of "suspended animation" until it
receives a hardware signal in the form of an interrupt or a
Direct Memory Access (DMA). The DMA function is not implemented
in the ERBE instruments, so the only means of exiting from an
IDLE condition is via a hardware interrupt. Interrupts are
implemented in the ERBE Scanner Instrument for 33 ms clock, the
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major frame clock, and azimuth drive. However, the processor
will not respond to these hardware signals if the interrupt
enable flag is not set.
In the fault mode simulation the processor executed the IDLE
instruction with the interrupt enable bit cleared. Execution of
this instruction effectively killed all microprocessor controlled
instrument functions including the issuing of scan drive
commands, acquisition of data, and transmission of DIG A data to
the spacecraft interface. The only possible exit from this
condition is a CPU-reset.
A Solar Calibration Sequence data table corresponding to this
failure hypothesis was generated. The commands and event times
from this table were used to predict the behavior of the flight
instrument. A Solar Calibration Sequence command was issued to
the instrument on September 15, and the flight data was in
complete agreement with the predictions.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The simulation results and the ability to predict the behavior of
the instrument when issued a solar calibration sequence strongly
support the conclusion that the cause of the NOAA-10 ERBE Scanner
malfunction is traceable to a failure of the internal address
decoding circuitry of the high ROM memory chip A2 A1-U50. The
failure causes a logical ANDing of multiple memory locations, and
the resulting erroneous code and/or data. When the erroneous
data and/or code is executed by a normally functioning
microprocessor, it produces the anomalous behavior and
malfunctions which have been observed in the flight instrument.
Since there is no method of reprogramming the processor, and
there are no alternate scan modes which are functional, the only
course of action which remained was to power-down and then power-
up the instrument on the chance that the failure in the ROM would
be self healing. The probability of this being successful was
low as the ROM memory chip (generic part S82S191) is a bipolar
fusible link device. When this was tried on October 17 and
failed to produce any change in instrument performance, no
further tests were recommended.
There are some similarities between failure of the ERBE Scanner
instruments on NOAA-9 and NOAA-10. However, since the scanner on
NOAA-9 would not respond to a CPU-Reset attributing the failure
to a memory failure would be speculative at best.
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Although the cause of the failure can not be determined from
available data, some comments can be made about the suspect part.
The 21002BJX ROM devices (generic part $82S191) is on the MIL-
38510 parts list and has been used extensively in military and
spaceflight hardware, including a total of eighteen devices
installed on the 6 ERBE Scanner and Nonscanner Instruments.
Records indicate that no failures have been recorded in
commercial, military or space use of the part due to
manufacturing defects. Some ionizing radiation testing has
shown, however, that this part is susceptible to single event
upset (SEU). Charge build-up within the device due to gamma ray
or high energy ion bombardment could cause bit latch-up and
failure• The excess parts lists from ERBE instrument fabrication
have been reviewed, and it has been determined that there are no
remaining ROM chips from the flight lot on which further tests
could be performed.
It is strongly recommended that Langley Research Center require
the CERES instruments and any other extended mission instrument
to be built with the capability of reprogramming the instrument
in flight• Since a ROM failure in the bootstrap program is just
as likely as in any other portion of code, it is further
recommended that instrument designs have redundant bootstrap
ROMs, direct RAM access from the spacecraft data bus, or
redundant processors.
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